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Bayes' Theorem in the Trial Process 
Instructing Jurors on the Value of Statistical Evidence* 
Dav id  L. Fa igman and A. J. Bagl ioni ,  Jr.? 
The use of statistics and probabilities a  legal evidence has recently come under increased scrutiny. 
Judges' and jurors' ability to understand and use this type of evidence has been of special concern. 
Finkelstein and Fairley (1970) proposed introducing Bayes' theorem into the courtroom to aid the 
fact-finder evaluate this type of evidence. The present study addressed individuals' ability to use 
statistical information as well as their ability to understand and use an expert's Bayesian explanation 
of that evidence. One hundred and eighty continuing education students were presented with a tran- 
script purportedly taken from an actual trial and were asked to make several subjective probabiliy 
judgments regarding blood-grouping evidence. The results extend to the trial process previous psy- 
chological research suggesting that individuals generally underutilize statistical information, as com- 
pared to a Bayesian model. In addition, subjects in this study generally ignored the expert's Bayesian 
explanation of the statistical evidence. 
INTRODUCTION 
Statistics and probabilities are receiving increased attention in the law. Since 1960 
there has been a dramatic growth of cases using some form of statistical evidence, 
with the greatest surge coming in the late 1970s (Fienberg & Straf, 1982; Note, 
1983). In light of this increased use in the courtroom, legal scholars have begun to 
debate the merits of various forms of statistical evidence. These commentators 
have been especially concerned with judges' and jurors' ability to understand and 
use this evidence. One proposal that has garnered much attention in this debate is 
* This study was conducted in fulfillment of the first author's requirement for a Master of Arts degree 
at the University of Virginia. A version of this paper was presented atthe 1983 American Psycholog- 
icaI Association convention in Anaheim, California. The authors would like to thank John Monahan, 
N, Dickon Reppucci, Lois A. Weithorn, and Timothy D. Wilson for comments on earlier drafts of 
this paper. 
t University of Virginia. 
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2 FAIGMAN AND BAGLIONI 
the proposed explicit use of Bayes' theorem in the trial process. Finkelstein and 
Fairley (1970) suggested that Bayes' theorem could potentially be used to explain 
to the trier of fact the proper way to combine certain types of evidence that might 
otherwise be difficult to understand. Specifically, Bayes' theorem could instruct 
jurors on how to combine statistical evidence with other, more qualitative, evi- 
dence in a trial.1 
The Finkelstein and Fairley proposal has been vigorously debated; and out of 
this debate two opposing views have arisen (see generally Weinstein, Mansfield, 
Abrams, & Berger, 1983). Tribe (1971a), the main proponent of the first view, 
assailed the use of Bayes' theorem in the trial process, arguing that the trier of 
1 A common expression of Bayes' theorem is as follows: 
p(B/a) p(A) 
p(A/B) = 
p(B/A)p(A) + p(B/not A) p(not A) 
As an example of how Bayes' theorem would work in the trial process, consider the following 
hypothetical case involving a defendant on trial for killing his employer with a ball point pen. It was 
shown at trial, among other things, that the defendant had fought with his boss over a highly sensi- 
tive issue and had stormed out of the office early on the day his boss was killed. The body was found 
by the cleaning crew at 7:00 p.m. that night. The defendant claimed that he had gone home and 
stayed there but no one could support his contention. An expert estified that the victim had been 
stabbed repeatedly with a ball point pen that contained a highly unusual kind of ink. The expert 
further testified that the defendant's pen contained ink of that same type, and that based on highly 
reliable data one would expect only 5% of all pens to contain that type of ink. The question is, how 
should a juror integrate this 5% probability figure into the other evidence already heard? Bayes' 
theorem addresses this question. 
Suppose a hypothetical juror believed, prior to hearing the expert testify, that she was 60% 
confident (i.e., had a subjective probability of 0.60) that the defendant had stabbed his employer with 
his pen [i.e., p(A) = 0.60]. Therefore, ' it follows that the probability hat he did not stab his em- 
ployer, based on the prior evidence, is 40% [i.e., p(not A) = 0.40]. Further, as the expert estified, 
the frequency generally of finding the type of ink that was in the murder weapon was only 5%. This 
is another way of saying that the probability of finding the particular type of ink in the defendant's 
pen if he did not stab his employer is 5% [i.e., p(B/not A) = 0.05]. The final probability needed to use 
Bayes' theorem is the probability of finding the ink type in the defendant's pen if he had indeed 
stabbed his employer. This can be assumed to be 100%, because if the defendant did use his pen to 
kill his employer then it is certain that its ink type matches the ink type of the murder weapon [i.e., 
p(B/A) = 1.0]. These figures can be substituted in as follows: 
(1.0)(0.60) 
p(A/B) = = O.967 
(1.0)(0.60) + (0.05)(0.40) 
Therefore, Bayes' theorem provides a straightforward device for assessing the probative value 
of certain evidence that might otherwise be difficult to assess. In this case if the juror had a subjec- 
tive belief prior to the expert's testimony that there was a 60% chance the defendant had stabbed his 
employer then she should have a 96.7% subjective belief after hearing the expert. 
It should be noted that the merits of using Bayes' theorem to compute the subjective probabili- 
ties in this fashion have been debated on philosophical grounds, Unfortunately, space does not 
permit a discussion of this debate. The reader is referred to several excellent resources that accom- 
plish this task; see in support of Bayes' theorem De Finetti (t972) and Savage (1972); and against, 
see Horwich (t982) and Shafer (1976). Legal commentators have also addressed these issues; see 
Brilmayer and Kornhauser (1978), Callan (1982), and Tribe (1971a, 1971b). For a discussion of this 
debate and its relevance to the psychological issues addressed in the present study, see Faigman 
(1984). 
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BAYES' THEOREM tN THE TRIAL PROCESS 3 
fact (i.e., a juror or, if a jury is waived, a judge), unsophisticated in the com- 
plexity of mathematical techniques, will be overwhelmed by the apparent cer- 
tainty of those techniques. In People v. Collins (1968), the California Supreme 
Court voiced a similar concern regarding statistical proofs in general when it 
warned that "[m]athematics, a veritable sorcerer in our computerized society, 
while assisting the trier of fact in the search for truth, must not [be allowed to] 
cast a spell over him" (p. 497). More recently, Saks and Kidd (1981) explicated an 
alternative view, arguing that rather than be overwhelmed by statistical informa- 
tion, triers of fact are more likely to ignore it. Basing their argument on studies 
conducted outside a legal context, Saks and Kidd held that people are generally 
poor processors of quantitative information when qualitative information is avail- 
able. They suggested that "It]he more realistic problem is presenting statistical 
evidence so that people will incorporate it into their decisions at all" (p. 149). 
As reflected in the foregoing debate, the Finkelstein and Fairley (1970) pro- 
posal rests on two assumptions concerning the capacity of individuals to process 
information. Foremost is the assumption that triers of fact do not use statistical 
evidence optimally. Their second assumption is that triers of fact will benefit from 
a Bayesian explanation of that evidence. Whereas both critics and proponents of 
Bayesian techniques accept he former assumption, critics argue that a Bayesian 
explanation will only serve to confuse the trier of fact more than the probabilities 
it purports to explain. 
According to the Federal Rules of Evidence, expert testimony is not admis- 
sible unless it will aid the trier of fact to determine some fact in issue. Also, the 
trial judge must determine whether expert testimony will confuse, prejudice, or 
waste the time of the trier of fact. The admissibility of an expert's Bayesian cal- 
calations, therefore, sts on the degree of assistance of those calculations bal- 
anced against he possibility that they will adversely effect the conduct or out- 
come of the trial. If triers of fact are able to use correctly statistical evidence, 
testimony intended to explain that evidence would be superfluous and inadmis- 
sible. In addition, if the statistical evidence or the Bayesian explanation of that 
evidence tended to overwhelm or otherwise prejudice the trier of fact, that evi- 
dence also would not be admissible. However, if individuals do not attribute 
proper weight to statistical evidence then testimony explaining the weight this 
evidence deserves might indeed be admissible. 
Use or Misuse of Probabilistic Evidence 
In support of their position, Saks and Kidd (1981) relied on a series of studies 
conducted by Tversky and Kahneman (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, 1973; 
Tversky, 1975; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, 1973, 1974, 1980). Kahneman and 
Tversky (1973) suggested that people use simplifying strategies or heuristics when 
assessing multiple bits of information. They found that people tend to ignore 
quantitative information in favor of more qualitative information when making 
judgments. Studies in this area have uniformly concluded thai people do not intu- 
itively conform to a Bayesian rule for integrating probabilities (Bar-Hillel, 1980; 
Bar-Hillel & Fischoff, t981; Borgida & Brekke, 1981; Fischoff & Beyth-Marom, 
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4 FAIGMAN AND BAGLIONI 
1983). Although some studies suggest that people process information in a Baye- 
sian fashion but do so conservatively (Edwards, 1968, 1975; Wells & Harvey, 
1978), investigations have generally shown that individuals do not intuitively un- 
derstand rules of statistical inference (Crocker, 1981; Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fis- 
choff, Layman & Coombs, 1978; Nisbet & Ross, 1980). These findings prompted 
Taylor and Thompson (1982) to comment hat apparently people have difficulty 
recognizing the causal relevance of statistical information when making judg- 
ments. 
Although the studies cited above demonstrate he problem, the methodolo- 
gies they adopt do not address the proposal in the legal literature. The proposal to 
use Bayesian techniques in the trial process incorporates the notion that an ex- 
plicit probability estimate will be made for the nonstatistical evidence presented 
at trial. This may be done by the trier of fact or by an expert witness (Ellman & 
Kaye, 1979). No study has yet tested the introduction of Bayesian techniques into 
the trial process under either scenario. The present study examines one of these 
scenarios by comparing subjects' subjective judgments of qualitative information 
with those same subjects' revised judgments after having heard the quantitative 
information. In practice, a trier of fact's probabilistic estimation may be made at 
one of two time points in the trial. One possibility entails the trier's estimation 
during the trial, when all of the qualitative vidence has been presented but be- 
fore the quantitative evidence is admitted. Alternatively, and more realistically, at 
the end of the trial the trier may be asked to consider what his or her estimation of 
the qualitative vidence had been and then asked to reevaluate it in light of the 
quantitative vidence. 
The purpose of the present study was to assess the two major assumptions 
underlying the proposed use and criticism of Bayes' theorem in the trial process. 
First, the study examined individuals' ability to integrate statistical evidence into 
the other more qualitative vidence of the case. Based on previous research in 
this area, individuals were expected to underutilize this information. Second, in- 
dividuals' ability to understand and use a Bayesian presentation was studied. No 
a priori hypotheses were set forth for this second question. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Subjects were 180 volunteers (96 females and 84 males) enrolled in con- 
tinuing adult education courses at several community colleges in Virginia. The 
mean age of the subjects was 26.6 (median age was 23), with a range of 18 to 59 
years. 
Procedure 
Subjects were randomly assigned to experimental condition and participated 
in the study in groups ranging from 7 to 35 during their regular evening class time. 
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BAYES' THEOREM 1N THE TRIAL PROCESS 5 
It took subjects from 35 to 45 minutes to complete the experiment. The experi- 
menter then conducted an extensive debriefing with each class, including a dis- 
cussion of their observations and reactions to the study. 
The Transcript 
The transcript was composed of five parts. 
1. Instructions. One page of instructions introdnced the subjects to the 
study. The subjects were told that the transcript they would read was from an 
actual court trial and they were asked to take the role of a juror in the trial. The 
instructions also notified the subjects that they would find questions within the 
body of the transcript. It was explained that many of these questions ask what the 
likelihood that a given statement is true and that they were posed in terms of 
percentages. Several examples were provided. The subjects were told that there 
were no right or wrong answers to these questions--all that was requested was 
their personal estimation. Finally, subjects were told that at the end of the tran- 
script they would be asked to come to a verdict, and to c me to a verdict of 
"guilty" only if the evidence warranted it beyond a reasonable doubt. 
2. Pretranscript Questionnaire. The pretranscript questionaire asked the 
subjects for personal background information, including sex, age, status as a reg- 
istered voter (i.e., whether currently registered to vote), juror experience, years 
of education, years of mathematics, and mathematics ourses taken. 
3. Trial Transcript. The trial transcript was written for use in this study. It 
contained opening instructions from the judge to the jury as well as opening state- 
ments from the prosecuting attorney and the defense counsel. The transcript pre- 
sented a case in which a male was arrested for breaking and entering a stereo 
shop and stealing merchandise and cash totaling $3,000.00. During the break-in 
the defendant allegedly cut his arm on broken glass from the window used to 
enter the store. The transcript included the direct examination and cross exami- 
nation of five witnesses: (A) The arresting police officer, who testified to his in- 
vestigation of the case, and the subsequent arrest of the defendant; (B) An eye- 
witness, who saw a car similar to the one driven by the defendant outside the 
stereo shop the night it was broken into. (C) The defendant, who gave vague and 
inconsistent testimony regarding the stereo receivers found in his apartment and 
his whereabouts he night of the burglary. He also testified that he had received 
the cuts and scars on his arm from his current job, construction work; (D) A 
physician, who testified to taking a blood sample from the defendant and com- 
paring it for blood type with the blood found at the scene of the crime, and he 
testified that they indeed matched. He also told the jury what proportion of the 
population had the defendant's blood type and explained to the jury what that 
figure meant (e.g., in the A blood-type condition: " . . .  if you had I00 people that 
were representative of the population, 40 of them would have type A blood 
. . ."). (E) A statistician, who testified how Bayes' theorem would evaluate the 
blood grouping evidence. He presented a chart to the jurors that displayed four 
prior probabilities (ranging from 1% to 80%) and their accompanying posterior 
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6 FAIGMAN AND BAGLIONI 
probabilities. There was no concluding summation by either the defense or prose- 
cution. 
4. Probes. There were three separate probes, each containing a set of in- 
structions and questions. These probes were placed within the transcript and 
completed by respondents before going on. (Note that not all subjects completed 
all three probes--see "Number of Probes," below.) The instructions explained 
to the subjects that the questions hould be answered on the basis of the evidence 
read up to that point. 
On each probe, subjects were asked to state the likelihood that the blood 
found in the stereo shop was the defendant's blood. In addition, two questions 
that were specific to the testimony heard just prior to the respective probe were 
asked. To answer these three questions, subjects had to circle a percentage figure 
on a scale that reflected their estimate of the likelihood the question was true. 
The scale had 21 points beginning at "1% or less" increasing in increments of five 
(rounded off, so the next point was 5%, then 10%, and so on) to a high point of 
"99% or more." Subjects were also asked, on each probe, to make a determina- 
tion of guilt based on the evidence already heard. 
5. Posttranscript Questionnaire. The posttranscript questionnaire contained 
ten questions. The first question asked subjects to render a verdict of guilty or not 
guilty. Questions two through six asked subjects to estimate how much weight 
they gave to each of the five witnesses when deciding on a verdict. The seventh 
and eighth questions were multiple choice questions designed to gauge the sub- 
jects' recollection and understanding of the Bayesian presentation. The ninth 
question asked the subjects to estimate what they had believed was the likelihood 
the blood found in the stereo shop was the defendant's blood, before they had 
read the physician's testimony (the prior probability). The tenth question asked 
the subjects to give a short explanation for their verdict and to include any obser- 
vations of the case they had. 
Independent Variables 
Blood-Grouping Evidence. Blood grouping evidence was selected as the ma- 
nipulation of probabilistic information for three reasons: It is legally relevant (i.e., 
it is generally considered admissible; see State v. Thomas, 1954; U.S.v.  
Kearney, 1969), it is assumed to be recognized as valid by the lay public, and its 
impact on the trier of fact has not been previously studied. Subjects were ran- 
domly assigned to one of three blood-type conditions, A, O, or AB. Within the 
transcript a physician testified that for each respective condition either 40%, 20%, 
or 5% of the population had that blood type.2 
Number of Probes. The number of probes was varied in an effort to assess 
2 These percentages are not the correct population frequencies. They were used instead of the actual 
percentages in an effort to increase the range available. The actual percentages for whites in the U.S. 
are 41.8, 44.4, and 3.8 for A, O, and AB, respectively. For blacks in the U.S., the percentages are 
26.5, 49.1, and 4.3, respectively (Blood and Other Body Fluids, 1961). Only one subject's responses 
had to be eliminated from the analyses because he knew that the percentage quoted by the physician 
was incorrect. 
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BAYES' THEOREM IN THE TRIAL PROCESS 7 
the effect, if any, quantifying an earlier probability would have on later proba- 
bility estimates. It was also important o assess the accumulating evidence at 
several points in the trial. The three most important junctures in the trial were 
before the physician's tatistical evidence, after the physician's tatistical evi- 
dence, and after the statistician's testimony. Therefore, in one condition, a probe 
was placed in each of these three places. In a second condition, probes were 
placed after the statistical evidence and after the statistician's Bayesian testi- 
mony. In a third condition, a probe was placed after the statistician's testimony 
only. 
Design. As the above indicates, the experimental design had two distinct 
phases dependent on the specific questions to be addressed. The over-riding de- 
sign was a 3 x 3 factorial with blood type and the number of probes as the be- 
tween-subjects factors. In addition, the responses of those subjects in the two- 
probe and three-probe conditions were examined as within-subjects factors for 
changes over the course of the transcript. The primary dependent measures were 
(1) the subjects' belief that the blood found was the defendant's blood, as deter- 
mined before the physician's testimony, after the physician's testimony, and after 
the statistician's testimony, and (2) Bayesian predictions computer calculated 
using each subject's "prior estimate" (i.e., respondents' ubjective probability 
estimates of the qualitative vidence; Bayesian predictions were calculated from 
subjects' estimates actually made before the physician's testimony as well as 
subjects' estimates made at the end of the transcript as to what their prior esti- 
mates had been). These measures were analyzed as ratio level data. Also, the 
subjects' assessment of guilt or innocence was a third dependent measure which 
was analyzed as a dichotomous categorical variable. 
RESULTS 
Preliminary analyses indicated that sex, age, education, voter status (i.e., 
registered versus not registered), or the subjects' mathematics background id 
not influence responses on any of the dependent measures. Those subjects with a 
mathematical background id, however, demonstrate a superior understanding of
the statistician's Bayesian presentation [G 2 (2) -- 8.33, p = .02]. 
The Probes 
Because the subjects had not yet received the blood grouping information, no 
significant results were expected, and none were found, on the first probe. 
As evidenced in Table 1, subjects in the AB condition (that is, the blood type 
with a 5% population frequency) overall gave significantly more weight to the 
blood grouping evidence [MANOVA: F(8,228) = 2.40, p = .017] than did either 
of the other two conditions, which did not differ. Individual ANOVAs and post 
hoc contrasts with Bonferoni's inequality imposed indicated that the AB condi- 
tion had higher estimates than the other two conditions in the belief that the blood 
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FAIGMAN AND BAGL1ONI 
Table 1. Mean Probabil ity a Ratings on Probes One, Two, and Three for 
All Subjects on Whether  the Blood Found Was the Defendant 's  Blood 
Blood type 
Location A O AB 
Probe 1 (n = 60) 63.5 (20.2) 61.2 (27.2) 50.2 (27.8) 
Probe 2 (n = 120) 62.3 (24.6) 61.8 (29.0) 78.6 (22.1) 
Probe 3 (n = 180) 64.4 (25.8) 64.5 (28.8) 77.9 (25.2) 
a Standard eviations are presented in parentheses. 
found in the stereo shop was the defendant's on the second probe [F(2,119) = 
6.1, p = .009] and on the third probe [F(2,179) = 5.1, p = .021]. 
The number of probes did affect subjects' judged likelihood estimates that 
the blood found was the defendant's blood. Subjects who estimated a subjective 
probability prior to the physician's testimony hadhigher estimates on the second 
probe IF(I,119) = 5.3, p = .024] and on the third probe [F(2,179) = 5.03, p = 
.008] than those who did not. Therefore, a comparison of subjects' responses on 
the first probe they received was conducted, thus creating a one-probe between- 
subjects design. As Figure 1 illustrates, subjects in the AB condition significantly 
differed from the other two groups in their probabilistic valuations after the phy- 
sician's testimony [F(2,57) = 7.24, p = .002], while the differences were not as 
great following the statistician's testimony. Moreover, contingency table analysis 
revealed that subjects in the AB condition were more likely to render a guilty 
verdict after the physician's testimony than either the A or the O conditions [G  2 
(2) = 6.79, p = .034; see Table 2]; whereas no significant differences in verdicts 
were found for blood-group condition after the statistician's te timony. 
Figure 2 illustrates a progressive revision upward of subjects' judgments in 
the three-probe condition and how those judgments compare to what Bayes' 
theorem would predict. A within-subjects repeated measures analysis of variance 
revealed an overall increase in subjective stimates for all blood-type conditions 
on the likelihood the blood found was the defendant's blood [F(2,56) = 21.3, p < 
.001]. Univariate tests revealed that these respondents' ubjective stimates sig- 
nificantly increased between the first probe and the second probe [F(1,57) = 
38.3, p < .001] as well as between the second probe and the third probe [F(1,57) 
= 4.62, p = .036]. Blood-type specific contrasts conducted on these results re- 
vealed that in the AB condition subjects ignificantly increased their estimates 
froim probe one to probe two [F(1,57) = 20.6, p < .001]. Subjects in the 0 condi- 
tion significantly increased their subjective judgments from probe two to probe 
three [F(1,57) = 5.0, p = .029). The upward revisions made by subjects in the A 
condition were not statistically significant. 
To compare subjects' judgments of the likelihood the blood found was the 
defendant's blood on the second and third probes to Bayesian predictions, a new 
dependent measure, the Bayesian probability for each subject, was computed 
using the individual's prior estimate and the blood-type condition he or she was 
in. This new dependent measure was examined via a repeated measures analysis. 
An ANOVA conducted on the differences between subjects' judgments on the 
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Probahility that 
the Blood Found 
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Position of First .Response 
Fig. 1, Comparison of respondents' ubjective probability judgments on the first probe they com- 
pleted (i.e., subjects in the three-probe condition completed their first probe before reading the physi- 
cian's testimony In = 60]; subjects in the two-probe condition completed their first probe after 
reading the physician's testimony [/~ = 60J; and subjects in the one-probe condition completed their 
only probe after reading the statistician's testimony [n = 60]). 
Th
is
 d
oc
um
en
t i
s c
op
yr
ig
ht
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
A
m
er
ic
an
 P
sy
ch
ol
og
ic
al
 A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
or
 o
ne
 o
f i
ts
 a
lli
ed
 p
ub
lis
he
rs
.  
Th
is
 a
rti
cl
e 
is
 in
te
nd
ed
 so
le
ly
 fo
r t
he
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
f t
he
 in
di
vi
du
al
 u
se
r a
nd
 is
 n
ot
 to
 b
e 
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
 b
ro
ad
ly
.
l0 FAIGMAN AND BAGLIONI 
second probe and their computed Bayesian predictions revealed that the former 
were significantly ower than the latter [F(1,57) = 13.7, p < .001]; while a similar 
ANOVA conducted on subjects' judgments on the third probe as compared to 
Bayesian predictions revealed a similar trend [F(1,57) = 6.6, p = .013]. Con- 
trasts conducted between subjects' judgments and the Bayesian predictions 
within each level of blood type revealed that onthe second probe subjects' judg- 
ments were not significantly different from Bayesian predictions for blood type A 
but they were for blood types O [F(1,57) = 5.38, p = .024] and AB [F(1,57) = 
6.38, p = .010]. However, on probe three, subjects' judgments were not signifi- 
cantly different for blood types A or O but were for blood type AB [F(1,57) = 
6.38, p = .014]. 
Figure 3 depicts a comparison between subjects' probability judgments (for 
subjects in the two-probe and three-probe conditions) on the second and third 
probes, as well as their end-of-transcript estimates of the prior probability, to 
what a Bayesian model would predict. Once again, a Bayesian comparison line 
was calculated, this time using subjects' "prior probability" judgments, as esti- 
mated at the end of the transcript, as well as their respective blood grouping 
condition. For subjects who received three probes, the correlation for judgments 
made on the first probe and estimates made at the end of the transcript was r(50) 
= .537 (p < .001)3; and a t-test on these two measures revealed no significant 
difference. 
Repeated measures analysis conducted on the responses of subjects who re- 
ceived multiple probes revealed an overall increase from their prior probabilities 
estimated at the end of the transcript as compared to the judgments made on the 
second and third probes [F(2,116) = 116.0, p < .001] (see Figure 3). Univariate 
tests revealed that these subjects' judgments ignificantly increased from the 
prior probabilities estimated at the end of the transcript o the second probe 
[F(1,117) = 31.05, p < .001] and from the second probe to the third probe 
[F(1,117) = 3.61, p = .06]. Contrasts conducted on these results revealed that 
subjects in the AB condition significantly increased their judgments from those 
Table 2. Frequency of Guilty versus Not Guilty 
Verdicts after the Physician's Testimony for Subjects 
who Received Two Probes 
Verdict 
Blood type Guilty Not guilty 
A 7 13 
O 10 10 
AB 15 5 
3 Note that, though significant, this correlation is surprisingly low considering that it should be 1.0. 
The query at the end of the transcript asked subjects to recall their stated prior subjective proba- 
bility. This result may lend some support o earlier research that indicated that individuals cannot 
separate what they "knew" from what they "'know" (e.g., Koriate, Lichtenstein, & Fischoff, 1980; 
Lichtenstein, Fischoff, & Phillips, 1977). 
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Fig. 2. Comparison ofrespondents' subjective probability judgments estimated prior to thephysician 
(probe one), after the physician (probe two), and after the statistician (probe three) to a Bayesian 
comparison line (for subjects in the three-probe condition, n = 60). 
estimated at the end of the transcript to those made on the second probe IF(l, ! t7) 
= 16.97, p < .001] but not from the second to the third probe. Subjects in the O 
condition did not significantly increase their prior judgments to those made on the 
second 0robe, but did significantly revise their judgments from the second probe 
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Fig. 3. Comparison of respondents' subjective probability judgments estimated at the end of the tran- 
script (prior probability), after the physician (probe two), and after the statistician (probe three) to a 
Bayesian comparison line (for subjects in the two-probe and three-probe conditions, n = 120).
to the third probe [F(1,117) = 9.0, p = .003]. Subjects in the A condit ion did not 
significantly revise their judgments.  
An ANOVA conducted on the difference scores between subjects'  judgments  
on the second probe and Bayesian predictions (see Figure 3) revealed that the 
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BAYES' THEOREM IN THE TRIAL PROCESS 13 
former were significantly lower than the latter IF(I,117) = 49.9, p < .001]; a 
similar ANOVA conducted on subjects' judgments on the third probe as com- 
pared to Bayesian predictions revealed a similar significant pattern [F(1,117) = 
35.44, p < .001]. Contrasts conducted between subjects' judgments and the 
Bayesian predictions within each level of blood type revealed that responses on 
probe two for blood types A, O, and AB were all significantly different from the 
Bayesian predictions [F(1,117) = 5.84, p = .017; F(1,117) = 29.5, p < .001; and 
F(1,117) = 19.25, p = .001, respectively]. Similar results were obtained for con- 
trasts between responses on the third probe and Bayesian predictions for blood 
types A, O, and AB IF(I,117) = 4.68, p = .033; F(1,117) = I5.02, p < .001; and 
F(1,117) = 18.25, p < .001, respectively]. 
Posttranscript Questionnaire 
Log-linear contingency table analysis revealed no significant relationship be- 
tween final determinations of guilty versus not guilty verdicts and either blood- 
type condition or number of probes completed. Contrasts conducted on the 
weights attributed to each of the witnesses revealed that subjects attributed sig- 
nificantly more weight to the physician than to the police officer [F(1,178) = 
9.63, p = .002], the eyewitness [F(1,178) = 65.51, p < .001], the defendant 
[F(1,178) = 45.25, p < .001], and the statistician [F(1,178) = 65.67, p < .001]. 
Also more weight was attributed to the police officer than to the eyewitness 
[F(1,178) = 45.34, p < .001], the defendant [F(1,178) = 25.42, p = .002), and the 
statistician [F(1,178) = 22.85, p < .001]. 
No differences were found between the two multiple choice questions de- 
signed to gauge respondents' recollection and understanding of the Bayesian pre- 
sentation on the frequency of getting one correct rather than the other. In all, 14% 
of the subjects answered both questions correctly, while 43.6% answered one 
correctly and 42.5% answered neither question correctly. As noted above, sub- 
jects with a mathematics background were more likely to answer these questions 
correctly than subjects with little or no mathematics background. Importantly, 
however, no relationship was obtained between subjects' understanding of the 
Bayesian presentation and either verdicts or use of the statistician's conclusions. 
Subjects who understood the presentation were no more or less tikely to use the 
information than subjects who did not understand it. 
D ISCUSSION 
The results of this study generally support and extend to the trial process the 
psychological research available on individuals' use of statistical information. 
Respondents significantly underutilized the statistical evidence. Indeed, except in 
the AB blood-group condition (i.e., presented with the 5% figure) and where sub- 
jects explicitly stated a prior probability (i.e., the three-probe condition), respon- 
dents virtually ignored the statistical evidence. Further, the subjects did not con- 
form to the expectations of either critics (e.g., Tribe, 1971a, 1971b) or proponents 
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14 FAIGMAN AND BAGLIONI 
(e.g., Finkelstein & Fairley, 1970, 1971) of the courtroom use of Bayes' theorem; 
they were not overwhelmed by this statistical theorem, nor did they accept the 
statistician's conclusions. Overall, subjects who estimated a prior probability on 
the first probe revised their estimates after the statistician testified as did subjects 
who estimated a prior probability at the end of the transcript. Yet, for both of 
these groups, the revisions remained significantly below the probabilities about 
which the statistician had testified (i.e., a Bayesian model). These findings lend 
support o previous research findings that identified individuals' reluctance to use 
statistical information when making causal attributions (Saks & Kidd, 1981). 
Subjects in the AB condition significantly utilized the blood grouping evi- 
dence while the other two conditions failed to recognize its relevance. They not 
only differed in the valuation of whether the blood found at the scene was the 
defendant's, but they also were more likely to render a guilty verdict. It is unclear 
why subjects found the AB blood-type to be particularly probative. One reason 
may be the extremity of the 5% figure. No studies have systematically investi- 
gated individuals' differential use of varying degrees of statistical information. 
Typically, researchers have used modest ratios such as 80/20 or 70/30. It may be 
that individuals process probability figures by giving some weight to extreme 
figures and little or no weight to modest figures, but do not discriminate between 
the two in any refined manner (Nisbet & Ross, 1980). Support for this interpreta- 
tion comes from the finding that even where subjects significantly utilized the 
statistical evidence they nevertheless underutilized it when compared to a Baye- 
sian model. 
Ajzen (1977) found that individuals look for causal explanations of events 
and that statistical information was more fully utilized when it fit a person's 
causal schemata. Apparently, people heuristically select information that directly 
pertains to some causal explanation of an event (Borgida & Brekke, 1981; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1980). Here, respondents confronted with an extreme 
probability figure may have been impressed by the significance of the figure and 
thus adopted it as support for their decision. This raises an interesting question 
for future research: is there an interaction between the causal relevance and the 
extreme degree of statistical evidence? 
A possibly related set of findings involved the effect of quantifying a prior 
probability on later likelihood judgments. There are several possible xplanations 
as to why subjects who estimated a probability prior to the physician's testimony 
subsequently had higher probability judgments than subjects who did not. Schum 
and Martin (1982) obtained a similar result when they compared individuals' sub- 
jective probability judgments for segments of a collection of evidence to indi- 
vidual's judgments for the entire collection of evidence. The most common expla- 
nation they identified was the "misaggregation hypothesis," which states that 
individuals use heuristic strategies to process information and therefore some of 
the information available is not utilized or fully processed (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1973). Another explanation is that people have a "response bias" against using 
large numbers (Ducharme, 1970) or simply do not want to overestimate he rele- 
vance of the information available. Although these explanations may play some 
part in the findings of the present study, another explanation seems more cogent. 
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BAYES' THEOREM IN THE TRIAL PROCESS 15 
Subjects who received two probes did not differ in their final probability judg- 
ments from subjects who received one probe. This finding suggests that simply 
estimating an earlier probability is not the important factor. Rather it appears that 
explicitly stating a prior probability before the physician testified sensitized sub- 
jects to the blood evidence. 
This finding suggests that explicit quantification of the nonstatistical evi- 
dence may increase the utilization of the statistical evidence. However, it is prob- 
ably not the quantification of the nonstatistical evidence that is important, but 
instead the attention hat is drawn to the statistical evidence. It may be that when 
a manipulation increases the attention given to a probability figure, or when a 
probability figure is sufficiently extreme to garner attention, it is more likely to be 
used in a fashion consistent with a Bayesian model. 
From a practical standpoint, however, even if courts allow an expert to tes- 
tify to a Bayesian interpretation of the evidence, they are unlikely to allow jurors 
to make explicit prior probability valuations before hearing the statistical evi- 
dence. This, of course, places a caveat on the finding that explicit quantification 
of the nonstatistical evidence increased the use of the statistical evidence. Tribe 
(1971a) contended that if courts do not allow this explicit quantification then there 
is the possibility the trier of fact will double-count the probabilistic evidence 
when evaluating the statistician's testimony. No evidence for this assertion was 
found in this study. In fact, subjects who received only one probe, after the statis- 
tician's testimony, actually quoted somewhat lower probability valuations than 
subjects who responded right after the physician's testimony (see Figure 1). This 
result may be a function of the subjects' general perception of the statistician as a 
witness. 
Overall, subjects did not differentially weigh any of the witnesses' testimony 
on the basis of blood type or number of probes. They rated the physician as the 
witness to whom they gave the most weight when determining a verdict. The 
police officer was accorded the second most weight. The statistician was only 
given as much weight as the eyewitness, who admitted to drinking the night of the 
burglary, and the defendant, whom the subjects aw, on average, as only 36% 
likely to be telling the truth. However, the statistician's testimony was seen, on 
average, as accurate (mean = 75.9). Apparently, subjects felt as the following 
subject succinctly put it: "I personally don't put much weight on statistical de- 
ductions as proof of anything." 
Although the results of this study have severat important implications for the 
trial process, they also have many limitations. Principally, the methodology em- 
ployed lacked the complexity and meaning of an actual trial. The subjects did not 
deliberate their responses in a group. Verdicts did not have consequences for any 
real person (save perhaps the authors). The experimental materials had to be read 
and the entire study only lasted approximately 40 minutes per subject. These 
factors may or may not have differentially influenced the results and hence have 
limited the generalizability of the study (Bray & Kerr, 1979; Weiten & Diamond, 
1979). 
Nonetheless, this study has several strengths that buttress the conclusions 
drawn from it. Foremost, it is based on a foundation of sound empirical research 
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16 FAIGMAN AND BAGLIONI 
that has obtained consistent results, utilizing various paradigms. Legal decision 
makers who desire to use social scientific findings to aid in difficult decision 
making would be well advised to rely on studies that have a sound theoretical 
foundation (Lind & Walker, 1979). 
Legal decision makers face several difficult issues involving the proposed 
use of Bayesian techniques in the trial process. As previous research has shown, 
and this study has supported, individuals tend to underutilize statistical informa- 
tion, although extreme probability figures may be utilized more than modest 
figures. This study has also found that explicit quantification of a prior probability 
does not hinder, and may in fact aid, an individual's use of statistical information. 
The results also suggest, contrary to Tribe's (1971a) assertion, that an expert's 
Bayesian formulation will not overwhelm the average trier of fact. Courts, it 
seems, should be less concerned with jurors being overwhelmed by the com- 
plexity of statistical techniques and more concerned with impressing upon jurors 
the relevance of those techniques. 
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